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This paper develops a formal theory of the endogenous process of the introduction of 
high quality products in developing countries. Initial differences in income and 
capital and transaction costs are shown to affect the emergence of and the size of the 
high quality economy. Initial differences in the production structure and the nature of 
transaction costs – as well as the possibility of contracting between producers and 
processors – are shown to determine which producers are included in the high quality 
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Quality and Inclusion of Small Producers in Value Chains:  
A Theoretical Note 
 
1. Introduction 
  Recent technological developments and globalization are transforming the 
industrial organization and international location of production. One of the most 
important mechanisms underlying the globalization process lies in the transfer of 
advanced production capabilities to low-wage economies. These capabilities 
comprise both an increase in productivity and in product quality  (Goldberg and 
Pavcnik, 2007; Eswaran and Kotwal, 2007). Sutton (2001) argues that the quality 
aspect is far the more important element: poor productivity can be offset by low wage 
rates, but until firms attain some threshold level of quality, they cannot achieve any 
sales in global markets, however low the local wage level. 
 These quality requirements affect poorer countries through several channels.
1 
First, increasing public quality requirements in richer countries are also imposed on 
imports and consequently have an impact on producers and traders in exporting 
nations (Jaffee and Henson, 2005; Unnevehr, 2000). Second, global supply chains are 
playing an increasingly important role in world food markets and the growth of these 
vertically coordinated marketing channels is facilitated by increasing quality 
standards (Swinnen, 2005; 2007). For example, modern retailing companies 
increasingly dominate international and local markets in fruits and vegetables, 
including those in many poorer countries, and have begun to set standards for food 
                                                 
1  This paper focuses on the development implications of changes in the demand for high quality 
products  There are several related areas in the literature on product quality standards, including a) 
analyses of asymmetric information problems which may be one of the reasons for companies or 
public regulators to introduce standards (Fulton and Giannakas, 2004; Gardner, 2003); b) studies on 
the role of standards in reducing consumption externalities (Copeland and Taylor, 1995; Besley and 
Ghatak, 2007); c) the role of standards in providing non-tariff trade protection (Anderson et al., 2004; 
Fischer and Serra, 2000); and d) the political economy of standards  (Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 
2008).    3
quality and safety in this sector wherever they are doing business (Dolan and 
Humphrey, 2000; Henson et al., 2000). Third, rising investment in processing and 
retailing in developing countries also has begun to be translated into higher quality 
standards, as buyers are making new demands on local producers in order to serve the 
high-end income consumers in the domestic economy or to minimize transaction 
costs in their regional distribution and supply chains (Dries and Swinnen, 2004; Dries 
et al., 2004; Reardon et al., 2003).   
  Importantly, the early literature posited that the rise of quality standards could 
have sharp negative influences on equity and poverty. Several of the studies argued 
that modern supply chains in developing countries would systematically exclude the 
poor and negatively affect the incomes of small farmers; in other words, it was being 
suggested that unlike other waves of rising economic activity, the poor would suffer 
from this process (Farina and Reardon, 2000). The predictions from these studies 
included the poorest parts of the world. For example, several studies of farm 
communities in Latin America and Africa argued that small farmers were being left 
behind in the supermarket-driven horticultural marketing and trade (Dolan and 
Humphrey, 2000; Humphrey et al., 2004; Key and Runsten, 1999; Reardon et al., 
2003; Weatherspoon et al., 2001). In a study on Kenya, Minot and Ngigi (2004) 
demonstrated that modern supply chains put intense pressure on smallholders 
(although smallholders were still participating). Even more extreme, in the case of 
Côte d’Ivoire, almost all of the fruit and vegetables being produced for exports were 
being cultivated on large industrial estates. Likewise, Weatherspoon and Reardon 
(2003) argued that the rise of supermarkets in Southern Africa failed to help small 
producers who were almost completely excluded from dynamic urban markets due to 
quality and safety requirements.      4
  Recent research suggests a more nuanced picture of the effect on poverty and 
its overall development implications. Dries and Swinnen (2004) find that high 
standards lead to increased vertical coordination in supply chains that is realized in 
their study area by the emergence of extensive contracting between processing 
companies and farmers. The rise of contracting, far from leading to the exclusion of 
poorer farmers, is shown to improve access to credit, technology and quality inputs 
for poor, small farmers that heretofore were faced with binding liquidity and 
information constraints due to poorly developed input markets. Minten et al. (2009) 
and Maertens and Swinnen (2009) also find increased vertical coordination in newly 
emerging supply chains between buyers and poor, small farmers in African countries, 
such as Madagascar and Senegal. According to their work, poor rural households 
experienced measurable gains from supplying high standard horticulture commodities 
to global retail chains. In China Wang et al. (2007) found that while rising urban 
incomes and emergence of a relatively wealthy middle class were associated with an 
enormous rise in the demand for fruits and vegetables, almost all of the increased 
supply was being produced by small, relatively poor farmers that sell to small, 
relatively poor traders. Despite sharp shifts in the downstream segment of the food 
chain towards modern retailing (e.g., there has been a rapid increase in the share of 
food purchased by urban consumers in supermarkets, convenience stores and 
restaurants), modern marketing chains have almost zero penetration to the farm level.  
These conflicting empirical findings are puzzling. Why would one observe 
such different outcomes? To understand better why different outcomes may emerge, 
this paper is the first
2 to develop a formal theory of the process where modern supply 
                                                 
2  Exceptions are some recent studies on the relationships between the local suppliers and modern 
processors/retailers in developing countries focusing on vertical coordination and rent distribution 
(Marcoul and Veysierre, 2008; Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2007). However these studies do not seek to 
explain the variations in the structure of the modern supply chains that one observes.   5
chains and demand signals are directing producers to grow and sell high quality and 
safe foods. We will use this theory to analyze whether this process may result in 
different outcomes when economies are characterized by different structural 
conditions. In particular, we analyze which producers are most likely to be included 
in these modern supply chains, and how the inclusion process is affect by factors such 
as the productivity distribution of producers and the nature of the transaction costs 
involved. In the last part of the paper we analyze the impact of contracting between 
processors and producers. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a formal model to 
analyse the endogenous process of the introduction of high quality products in 
developing countries. We discuss the structural factors of the market equilibrium 
resulting from this model. Sections 3 and 4 analyze how the inclusivity of this process 
towards producers is influenced by respectively the production structure and the 
nature of transaction costs. Section 5 discusses the impact of contracting between 
processors and producers on this process and its inclusivity. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
Demand 
To model the demand side, we draw upon the vertical differentiation 
literature.
3  We consider the unit-demand version of the standard vertical product 
differentiation model whereby each consumer buys at most one unit of the good. The 
                                                 
3  The literature started with papers explaining the emergence of endogenous quality outcomes in 
monopolized markets (Spence, 1975; Mussa and Rosen, 1978) and in monopolistic competition and 
oligopoly markets (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983; Tirole, 1988). 
Ellickson (2006) examines vertical differentiation in the context of grocery retailing and Roe and 
Sheldon (2007) examine labelling and credence features of products using a vertical differentiation 
model.   6
model is adjusted for a limited number of product types and relates income directly to 
the preferences for quality, following Tirole (1988).
4  
Assume that there are only two types of products with different qualities in 
this market, a basic low quality ( L φ ) product and a high quality ( HL φ φ > ) product. 
When both qualities are available, consumers choose among three options: 
(1) 
        if the high quality good is bought
         if the low quality good is bought












where  H φ  and  L φ  are  the qualities  and  H P  and  L P   are the unit consumer prices of 
respectively the high and low standards product; the index  (1 , ) iI I R + ∈ −⊆ represents 
consumer income. Consumers with higher incomes are assumed to have higher 
preferences for quality. The distribution of income  () Fi is uniform between  1 I −  and 
I , where the latter is the highest income among consumers. We assume that the 
distribution of income does not change when income grows so that an increase of 
aggregate income can be represented by an increase of I . 
When both high quality (HQ) and low quality (LQ) products are bought by 
some consumers when available and some consumers buy nothing (i.e., there is an 
‘uncovered’ market), the aggregate market demand functions 
D
H Q  and 
D






















                                                 
4 Our approach implicitly assumes that the introduction of high quality reflects consumer preferences. 
Another reason why a company may want to introduce certain quality or process standards is to reduce 
transaction costs in sourcing and selling (Henson, 2006; McCluskey, 2007; Fulponi, 2007). Since the 
introduction of quality or process standards for these purposes would also require specific investments 
by suppliers (hence higher production costs) and (increased) transaction costs for the processors, most 
of such effects would be similar to the analysis in this paper.          7
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On the supply side, we assume a standard competitive industry populated by 
numerous producers who behave as price takers. In our model all producers are able 
to produce either the high quality or the low quality product. To start, we assume that 
producers are identical. Later in the paper we will relax this assumption and analyze 
how producer differences affect their integration into the high quality economy. 
We assume further that producers have a production technology that requires 
a unit cost  H c  and  L c , for the high and low quality product respectively, and that 
HL cc k =+ , where k is the per unit additional capital costs for producing the high 
quality product.
6 Finally, for simplicity, we assume that the other costs remain the 
same and that producers can produce the same number of units of the commodity 
regardless of whether they produce low quality or high quality commodities.
7   
 
                                                 
5 See Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Tirole (1988) for formal derivations of these conclusions.  
6 We ignore quality uncertainty, so each farm can meet the processor’s quality threshold with certainty 
if it makes a predetermined capital investment. We also ignore issues of contracting and contract 
enforcement in the HQ chain. For more details about this, see Swinnen and Vandeplas (2007) who 
show that the premium itself will depend on the contract enforcement conditions.  
7 This assumption is consistent, for example, with a farmer who may produce 100 litres of non-cooled, 
high-bacteria milk if operating in the low quality market or, after an investment in a cooling tank is 
made, 100 litres of cooled, low-bacteria milk if operating in the high quality market.   8
Marketing and Trade 
Once the products are produced in response to consumer demand, our model 
needs to account for the transfer of the commodities from farm to plate. For 
simplicity we assume that one unit of production is identical to one unit at retail 
(consumer) level for both high and low quality. We use different marketing 
assumptions for the LQ products and the HQ products. We assume that producers sell 
their LQ commodity in villages and city markets at price L P  under  perfect 
competition. For the HQ supply chain, we assume that ‘processors’ (which may 
represent any company involved in processing, marketing or retailing) purchase the 
HQ commodity from producers at price  H p  and resell this commodity to consumers 
at price H P . We consider that these companies incur a unit transaction cost τ  in 
sourcing from producers. Under perfect competition and free entry and exit for 
processors, it follows that the consumer price of the commodity is the sum of the 
producer price and the transaction cost, such that  HH Ppτ = + .
8 
 
Structural Factors and the Market Equilibrium 
 
With producers’ supply of low and high quality products determined by their 
respective marginal costs  L c  and  H c  and the demand functions (2) and (3) we can 
derive the market equilibrium level of LQ products ( )
*
L X  and HQ products ()
*
H X  as 
follows:  
                                                 
8 We ignore ‘processing costs’ because they only complicate the mathematics but do not affect the 
conclusions. We also considered an alternative model with a monopolistic market structure in 
processing. Again, this vastly complicated the model without yielding substantial differences in the key 
results regarding the issues where this paper focuses on. See Swinnen and Vandeplas (2007) for an 
























Equations (4) and (5) incorporate the relationship between a series of 
structural variables and the relative importance of the high and low quality 
economies. For each of the key variables ( ) ,,, Ikτ φ  one can identify threshold levels 
(either minima or maxima) for the high quality economy (HQE) to exist, i.e. for 
* 0 H X > . For positive levels of 
*
H X , one can use comparative statics to show how the 
variables affect the size of the HQE. 
Income ( ) I . The size of the HQE is directly related to the level of income in 
the economy. A minimum level of income is required for a HQE to emerge. Formally, 






> . Hence, one of the basic results that falls out of our model 
is consistent with the observation that HQ markets are more likely found in countries 
with higher incomes than in countries with lower incomes. Additionally, once income 








=> ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
. The positive effect of I  on 
*
H X  is also consistent with 
the observation that HQ production systems tend to emerge first in export sectors in 
developing countries. For example in many African economies HQ production is 
limited to supply chains targeted to (high income) EU consumer markets while 
production for domestic markets is limited to LQ production. 
Capital costs  ( ) k .  In many developing countries capital constraints are 
important and the real cost of capital is high. According to our model this is another   10
reason that HQ markets are less likely to emerge in developing countries. If capital 
costs of producing HQ are too high, i.e. if kI φ τ >− , then no HQE will emerge. 
Moreover, given that a HQE exists, the size of the HQE will be smaller if capital 









Quality difference ( ) φ : An additional condition for the emergence of a HQE 
is that the high quality level is sufficiently larger than the low quality level, given the 







>  holds. Given that this condition is fulfilled, the HQE will be larger for 
larger quality differences  ( )
*
2 0






However, as we will show in the next sections, these conclusions need to be 
nuanced when one allows explicitly for details on the production structure as well as 
on the nature of transaction costs in the model. 
 
3. Production Structure 
In addition to being able to predict the factors that underlie the emergence of 
the HQE, our model can also be used to gain insights on what types of producers are 
most likely to join the HQE (when it emerges) and what types of producers will likely 
be left out. As discussed in the introduction, this issue has attracted a lot of policy 
attention and academic debate. Some studies have argued that smallholders are 
excluded from HQE due to scale diseconomies and higher transaction costs; others 
have argued that this is not (necessarily) the case. 
The arguments used in the literature are often quite simplistic. In fact, they 
may also be too simplistic. For example, the impact of scale economies is not as   11
trivial as often argued.
 9 Scale economies can differ strongly between activities (e.g. 
extensive grain farming compared to intensive vegetable or dairy production). Scale 
economies also may be influenced by local institutions and market constraints. 
While scale economies can be important, in our analysis here we focus on two 
other factors, the initial production structure of the economy and the nature of the 
transaction costs. We will show that both factors have an important impact on the size 
of the HQE and on who is included in the HQE.   
One of our key arguments is that initial conditions matter. One might expect 
different outcomes from the emergence of the HQE in rural settings that have highly 
unequal distributions of land resources (such as, in some nations in Latin America 
and parts of the former Soviet Union—which have some individuals holding massive 
estates and many smaller, relatively poor farmers), compared to rural societies 
characterized by more egalitarian distributions of cultivated land (e.g., China, 
Vietnam and Poland). In the rest of the analysis we call this the production structure 
of the rural economy. In this section we will formally show that the initial production 
structure indeed matters: the share of smallholders in the production system – and the 
existence of large holdings amongst the smallholders – will affect both the size of the 
HQE and the integration of smallholders into the HQE. To analyze this we relax the 
assumption of a homogenous producer structure. This means that k  is not necessarily 
                                                 
9 There is an extensive literature showing how farm productivity, and in particular the relationship 
between size and productivity, tends to differ importantly by commodity (e.g. Allen and Lueck, 1998; 
Pollak, 1985). For example, while large producers may have scale advantages in land intensive 
commodities, such as wheat or corn, this is typically much less the case in labor intensive 
commodities, such as fruits and vegetables. In fact, there are cases in which small-scale producers may 
have advantages over larger farmers. In the production of some HQ commodities, small farmers may 
have an advantage over larger farmers because of the importance of labor governance and the quality 
of the labor input. This implies that the inclusion or exclusion of small farms is likely to depend 
importantly on the type of the commodity. This is consistent with findings from Wang et al. (2007) on 
China and Minten et al. (2009) on Madagascar who find that smallholders are extensively included in 
labor intensive fruits and vegetable production.   12
identical for all producers. In line with our general model, we introduce producer 
heterogeneity by varying the capital cost k . 
We assume that capital cost  j k  for producer j is uniformly distributed across 
N producers with   [] , jk k kk k γ γ ∈− +   { } 1,..., j N ∀=  and  [ ] 0, k k γ ∈  with  0 k ≥ . For 
simplicity, we assume that individual producers only produce one unit of the high 
standards product, when they are involved in the HQE.
10 Producers with lower capital 
costs are more efficient. 
We can now consider variation in the production structure by considering 
changes in  k γ . Specifically, the extreme case of homogeneous farms – which was the 
assumption in the first part of the paper – is represented by  0 k γ = . The efficiency 
distribution is increasingly unequal as  k γ  increases. With any given distribution, the 
average efficiency is represented by capital cost k (as in the general model). 
The supply curves for heterogeneous and homogeneous production structures 
are shown in Figure 1. In this graphical representation  ( ) 0
S
Hk X γ =  represents the 
supply function for homogeneous producers. Likewise,  ( ) 0
S
Hk X γ >   is the supply 
function for heterogeneous producers.  
When producers choose to produce the HQ products, under the assumption 
that one producer produces only one unit of output in the HQE, their profits are 
HH p c − , with  
HL cc k =+  where   k   is the capital cost of the producer that is 
indifferent between producing for the HQE and the LQE. Using this, we can then 
derive the aggregate supply of HQ products as: 
                                                 
10 Alternatively, one could fix the inputs and consider variation in output, or consider variations in 
input and/or output size. Our specification is closer to the basic model specification and allows to 


















  This, in turn, leads to a new expression for the equilibrium quantity in the HQ 
market: 













⎛⎞ −+ ⎛⎞ =− ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
. 
Comparing (5) and (7) yields some important insights. The second term of the 
right hand side (RHS) of condition (7) shows that the HQE will emerge at lower 
income levels with a heterogeneous production structure than with a more 






>  is the condition for the HQE to 
emerge. With  0 k γ >   the required income level is lower than when  0 k γ = . In 
addition, the required income level (for the emergence of a HQE) declines when the 
distribution is more unequal (that is, when  k γ  is higher). The intuitive reason for this 
finding is that when an economy faces a more heterogeneous production structure, 
this implies that there are more efficient producers among the entire set of producers, 
ceteris paribus. As a result of this, these producers will be able to produce HQ 
products when it is not possible when the economy is characterized by a 
homogeneous production structure. 
However, the third term of the RHS of condition (7) implies that the 
expansion of HQ production – once it exists – proceeds more gradually when there is 
a heterogeneous distribution of farms. To see this, define  2 k B MN γ φ = . The third 
term then equals 1( 1 ) B + , which is less than 1 with  0 B > . Formally, 
                                                 
11 When  0 k γ = , the HQ output 
S
H X  is completely determined by demand in the equilibrium (perfectly 









. With  0 B =  when  0 k γ = , and  0 k B γ ∂ ∂>, it follows that the 
growth in 
*
H X  with increasing income will be more gradual when there is a more 
heterogeneous set of producers – given that 
* 0 H X > . These results are illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
In Figure 1  ( ) 0
S
Hk X γ =   represents the supply function for homogeneous 
producers and  () 0
S
Hk X γ >  the supply function for heterogeneous producers. For low 
income, represented by demand function  1
D
H Q   for high standards products, the 
equilibrium output in the high standards market is zero with homogeneously 
distributed producers i.e.  ( )
*
1 00 Hk X γ = = . In contrast, under a heterogeneous 
producer structure, the HQE does emerge and the equilibrium is at point A. HQ 
output is equal to  ( )
*
1 0 Hk X γ > . For increasing higher income levels, represented by 
demand curves  2
D
H Q  and  3
D
H Q , the market equilibrium with the heterogeneous 
structure shifts to points B and C, respectively. For the homogeneous production 
structure, there will also be positive HQ output at  2
D
H Q  and  3
D
H Q , represented by 
points D and E, respectively. 
Figure 1 thus illustrates that HQ production emerges at lower levels of income 
for heterogeneous structure (represented by point A). However, once the HQ emerges 
in an economy characterized by a more homogeneous structure, the growth of HQE is 
more rapid as income grows. When examining Figure 1, note that the growth of 
production is represented by the shift from point D to E is larger than for the shift 
from B to C.   15








  as illustrated by point G, there is no HQE under either the 
heterogeneous or homogeneous structure. As income increases, however, the HQE 







> , shown by point A. Under the assumption that a nation’s production 
structure is more homogeneous, the minimum income requirement for the emergence 

















HQE exists under the heterogeneous structure (point A), but does not (yet) exist under 
the homogeneous structure (point F). At higher incomes, HQ production is also 
positive for the homogeneous structure, but output remains higher for heterogeneous 









(Point H). At higher incomes, the homogeneous producer structure produces higher 












+ , the HQE will include all producers under the homogeneous structure 
in contrast to the heterogeneous structure, shown respectively by points K and J.  
This approach also allows to analyze who is included in the HQE. With a 
heterogeneous production structure, the most productive farms will start producing 
HQ at low income levels. However, given the same set of incomes and other factors, 
the less productive farms will be excluded. When the production structure of an 
economy is more homogeneous, HQ production will only start at higher income 
levels. Although beginning later in the development process, once started the process   16
will be more inclusive. More producers will be included. This insight can be seen 
graphically in Figure 3. The line that divides the graph between the LQE and the 
HQE is characterized by 
k k γ τ
φ
−+
, which is the minimum income level required for 
a HQE to emerge under given producer heterogeneity  k γ . It illustrates again that 
when producers are more heterogeneous, there is a more rapid emergence of the 
HQE—given certain levels of income growth. In addition, under our assumption that 
more productive producers have lower capital costs  j k , Figure 3 also illustrates that 
when income increases, a homogeneous producer structure is more inclusive towards 
low productivity producers. At high levels of income, all producers will be included 
under any distribution. 
 
4. Transaction Costs 
The nature of transaction costs is another fundamental feature of an economy 
that can affect the HQE. First, transaction costs will affect the overall size of HQ 






=− < ⎜ ∂ ⎝
, 
see equation (5)). It makes sourcing from suppliers more costly and therefore 
increases the relative cost of the HQ products. 
Second, transaction costs will also affect who is included. In the literature, a 
standard argument is that there are fixed transaction costs per supplier for processors. 
This implies that transaction costs per unit of output are lower for large producers and 
hence small producers will be excluded. However, such conclusion is overly 
simplistic and depends on the specific (often implicit) assumptions on the nature of 
the transaction costs. In reality there are different types of transaction costs that might   17
be important when processors source HQ commodities from producers. For example, 
one common type of transaction costs might include costs of search (by company 
procurement agents that are looking for producers that are willing to supply to the 
HQE), supervision costs, quality and process control costs and the costs of 
enforcement of agreements. As an illustration, consider the following example from 
Minten et al (2009), which studies processor-farmer interactions in a HQ vegetable 
production region which produce horticultural exports in Madagascar for the 
European Union: 
“To monitor the correct implementation of the [HQ] conditions, the 
[processor] has …around 300 extension agents who are permanently on the 
payroll of the company. Every extension agent is responsible for about thirty 
farmers. To supervise these, (s)he coordinates [another] five or six extension 
assistants ... that live in the village itself. During the cultivation period of the 
[HQ] vegetables, the farmer is visited on average more than once a week …to 
ensure correct production management as well as to avoid ‘side-selling’. 
…99% of the farmers say that the firm knows the exact location of the plot; 
92% of the farmers say that the firm even knows …the number of plants on the 
plot.  For crucial aspects of the production process, such as pesticide 
application, representatives of the company will even intervene in the 
production management to ensure it is rightly done.  [One-third] of the 
farmers report that representatives of the firm will themselves put the 
pesticides on the crops to ensure that it is rightly done.” (p. 14). 
This example clearly illustrates that the notion of fixed transaction costs per 
supplier is not (necessarily) consistent with reality. For conceptual purposes, one 
could distinguish three types of transaction costs: those which are fixed per supplier 
(e.g. contract negotiation costs), those which are fixed per unit of output (e.g. output 
control costs) and those which are fixed per unit of production input (e.g. monitoring 
of plots and production activities). 
  To show that these different types of transaction costs will have different 
effects in the emergence, size and composition of the HQE, we compare two types of 
transaction costs. Specifically, we assume that  j τ  is a producer specific transaction   18
costs. It is uniformly distributed over the interval [ ] , τ τ τ γτ γ −+  with  [] 0, τ γ τ ∈  and 
0 τ ≥ . With transaction costs defined in this way, we first consider the case when 
transaction costs are fixed per producer. This means that transaction costs are 
identical for all producers (or,  0 τ γ =  and  j τ τ = ). In the second case, we consider 
transaction costs which are fixed per unit of input. This implies that transaction costs 
are negatively related to producer productivity, i.e.  0 jj k τ ∂ ∂>. 
It is immediately clear that these different types of transaction costs will have 
fundamentally different implications for which producers will be included in the 
HQE. In one case, the transaction costs will be ‘neutral’ regarding productivity 
heterogeneity; in the other case, they will reinforce the productivity-bias. Formally 
this can be seen from the new condition for the equilibrium output of HQ products 
with producer specific transaction costs: 

















⎡⎤ −+ − ⎛⎞ =− ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟
⎣⎦ + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠
. 
It follows from equation (8) that the structure with heterogeneous transaction 
costs, i.e.  0 τ γ ≠ , will induce earlier emergence of HQE for increasing income levels. 






> , which is less restrictive for higher  τ γ  
(more heterogeneity in transaction costs). 
Figure 4 illustrates this effect. The HQ supply function with fixed transaction 
costs  ( ) 0 τ γ =   per supplier is identical to that of Figure 1 with heterogeneous 
suppliers.
12 It follows from equation (8) that with heterogeneous transaction costs, the 
                                                 
12 Note that in case of homogeneous suppliers, there is no effect of the nature of the transaction costs on 
who get included since all suppliers (and thus their transaction costs) are identical.   19
HQ supply function pivots around point H. This implies more HQ supply at lower 
levels of income (represented by  1
D
H Q ) but less supply at higher levels of income. As 
is illustrated in Figure 4, the negative relation of transaction costs with productivity 
reinforces the productivity effect in this pivot of the supply function. 
The impact on who gets included when considering the nature of transaction 
costs is also analogous to the discussion over the production structure of the economy. 
Low productive suppliers will be less likely included with transaction costs fixed per 
unit of input, and vice versa. In this way, transaction costs reinforce the productivity 
effect, in the sense that they reduce the purchasing costs for processors from more 
productive farms. Farms with higher productivity will have even more cost 
advantages because the per unit transaction costs are lower. However, this result 
depends on the nature of “transaction costs.” If fixed transaction costs are per farm, 
this is not the case. 
Notice that one should be careful in interpreting these findings. Our specific 
findings are conditional on our model specification, which assumes there is a fixed 
output per farm. However, our main result, i.e. that the impact on the inclusion in the 
HQE depends on the nature of the transaction costs, holds in general. In reality, some 
transaction costs are fixed per farm, such as those for bargaining and search. Other 
costs however, such as product or process control costs, would at least have a 
component that is better modelled as per unit of output or input cost. To the extent 
that these variable transaction costs are more important, the cost advantage of large 
and more productive farms will change. 
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5.  Contracting 
In developing countries, processing firms or large traders often face lower 
capital costs or are less capital constrained than producers. As a consequence of this 
asymmetric capital market imperfection, processors and producers may start a process 
of vertical coordination or contracting by which the processors supply the producers 
with the capital necessary to produce the high quality product. This is consistent with 
empirical observations that the introduction of higher quality requirements in 
transition and developing countries has coincided with the growth of contracting 
(Swinnen, 2007). Empirical studies show that local producers in developing countries 
are engaging in complex contracting with processors selling into high quality markets. 
These contracts not only specify conditions for delivery and production processes but 
also include the provision of inputs, credit, technology, management advice etc. 
(Minten et al., 2009; World Bank, 2005b). The latter are particularly important for 
local producers who face important local factor market imperfections. If the 
institutional environment is such that producers and processors have the possibility to 
contract the production of high quality products, this may have important implications 
for the emergence, growth, size, and inclusivity of the HQE. 
To analyze the impact of contracting in our HQE framework, we use a 
simplified version of the contract model that is typically used to study these 
problems.
13  We assume that all processors face a specific capital cost  p k . When 
processors contract producers, we further assume that processors can provide the 
capital necessary to produce the high quality product to producers at the cost  p k  
(instead of the producer’s individual capital cost  j k ).  
                                                 
13 See Swinnen and Vandeplas (2007) for an extensive analysis of such models and the impact of 
competition and imperfect enforcement on (the efficiency of) contracting between processors and 
producers.   21
Processors and producers will only participate in this type of contracting if the 
processors’ capital cost  p k  is smaller than the producer’s individual capital cost  j k . 
As before, we assume that the individual capital cost  j k  differs among producers and 
is uniformly distributed, but for simplicity we assume identical transaction costs τ  
(i.e. transaction costs are fixed per producer).  
The impact of (the possibility of) contracting on the emergence, growth, size, 
and inclusivity of the HQE strongly depends on the relative capital cost of processors 
() p k  with respect to the capital cost k  of the producer who is indifferent between 
producing for the HQE and the LQE if the option of contracting is not available. In 
other words, the latter is the equilibrium capital cost in the case without contracting, 
and can be derived from combining equations (2) and (6) with, as before, 

















=   as before. Whether contracting has an impact on the market 
equilibrium in the HQE depends on whether  p kk ≥   or  p kk <  . 
First, consider the situation where  p kk ≥  , i.e. where the capital cost of 
processors is larger than the capital cost of the indifferent producer in the equilibrium 
without contracting (Equation (7)). In this case the possibility of contracting does not 
impact on the HQE as contracting will not occur. Only producers with  j kk ≤   
participate in the HQE, but only producers with  jp kk ≥   would benefit from 
contracting with a processor. However, as  p kk ≥  , no producer involved in the HQE   22
will contract with a processor. Because the capital that processors may provide with is 
more costly than the capital of the indifferent producer, contracting is not desirable.  
Second, when  p kk <  , contracting does have an impact on the emergence, 
size, and inclusivity of the HQE. In Figure 5, the equilibrium without contracting is 
depicted by point ()
* , H Xk   and the contracting equilibrium by ( )
*,
c
H p Xk, where 
* c
H X  
is the equilibrium HQ output under contracting. As before, 
*
H X  is determined by (7) 












Contracting will have an impact on the emergence of the HQE when 
pk kk k γ <− < . This case is illustrated in Figure 5 by  p k′ . In an analysis similar to the 
one in Figure 1, for sufficiently low levels of income I  and a subsequent low level of 
demand 
D
H Q , there is a positive equilibrium in the HQE with contracting (supply 
function  ( ) ;0
S
Hp k Xk γ ′ > ) while there is no HQE without contracting (supply function 
( ) 0
S














pk kk γ ′ ≤− . 
Next, consider the case where  kp kk k γ − ≤<  . The HQE will emerge when 






> , with and without 
contracting (see Figure 5). Therefore contracting does not have an impact on the 
emergence of the HQE for  p k kk γ ≥− . However, comparing (7) and (10), it follows   23
that for  p kk <   contracting will have an impact on the size of the HQE and on its 
suppliers.  
First, the HQE will be larger with the possibility of contracting, i.e. 
** c
H H XX > , 
which is clear in Figure 5. By supplying cheaper capital to producers with  jp kk > , 
contracting enlarges the set of producers who are able to produce the high quality 
product at a given equilibrium price. As a consequence, for the same level of income 
and willingness to pay for high quality by consumers (demand function 
D
H Q ), the 








 and that  p kk <   (the equilibrium capital cost in the respective situations), it 
must be that 
** c
H H XX > . 







γ φ τ − −
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++
 , the 
expansion of HQ production proceeds faster under the possibility of contracting. This 
can be seen in Figure 5 by shifting the demand function 
D
H Q   to the right, which 
represents an increase in consumers’ income. The increase in 
* c
H X  will be larger than 
the increase in 
*
H X , ceteris paribus, which is analogous to our earlier comparison 
between homogeneous and heterogeneous production structures (see Figure 1). By 
providing capital to producers at the same cost – irrespective of the producers’ 
different individual capital costs – processors create homogeneity in the production 
structure, at least for producers in the range for which  jp kk >  holds. 
Third, contracting between processors and producers induces the HQE to 
become more inclusive towards less productive producers, for two reasons. The HQE 
is larger under contracting and thus more producers will be included, which implies   24
also less productive ones. In addition, processors are indifferent towards contracting 
with producers j  with  , jp k kk k γ ⎡⎤ ∈+ ⎣⎦ . As before, the possibility of contracting 
creates homogeneity in the production structure for  jp kk > , and as we already 
analyzed a homogeneous production structure creates higher inclusivity (see Figure 
3). Therefore contracting creates more inclusivity towards less productive producers 
also for this reason. 
In conclusion, if processors face sufficiently lower capital costs than 
producers, contracting will improve the size, growth, and inclusivity of the HQE, and 
in extreme cases it may even lead to an earlier emergence of the HQE. This linkage 
between the cost of capital, contracting, and the emergence of the HQE offers an 
explanation for the empirical observation foreign direct investment (FDI) play an 
important role in the emergence of HQEs (e.g. Dries and Swinnen, 2004). Processors 
have developed VC arrangements with supplying farms to provide capital inputs to 
farms who are capital constrained, either because of the collapse of the financial 
system (e.g., in transition countries – see Gow and Swinnen, 1998; World Bank, 
2005a) or because of general credit constraints of farmers in developing countries 
(e.g., Minten et al., 2009; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). To set up such VC 
arrangements, processors themselves need sufficient access to capital. This is why 
FDI – or other institutional arrangements which enhance the access of processors to 
capital markets have played an important role. While FDI may have more than one 
effect on the emergence of a HQE, a crucial element is that, with capital market 
imperfections in developing countries, foreign companies frequently have lower 
capital costs (or face less restrictive credit constraints) than domestic companies in 
developing countries. Because of this, foreign firms may therefore be able to invest,   25
using lower cost capital when it is not possible for domestic companies to do so.
14 
Through VC this, in turn, leads to reduced capital costs for farmers with FDI. Section 
5 clearly showed the beneficial impact of contracting on the emergence of the HQE in 
line with the empirical observations. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have developed a formal theory of the process of the 
endogenous introduction of high quality products in developing countries. We use our 
theoretical model to analyze how different structural conditions of the economy affect 
the emergence and size of the high quality economy (HQE). Differences in the form 
of the level of income, the relative cost of capital, the extent and nature of transaction 
costs and whether the production structure is homogeneous or heterogeneous will 
affect the timing of the emergence and the size of the HQE. These results can be used 
to gain insights on how institutional reforms, including macro-economic stabilization, 
liberalization of trade and foreign investment regulations can have important impacts 
on the growth of the HQE. In particular, these and any other policy change that 
reduces the cost of capital, according to our model, will play an important role in 
stimulating the growth of the HQE.  
We also examine which factors affect who is able to participate in the HQE as 
it is emerging. Not surprisingly, we find that the most productive farms switch first to 
producing for the HQ market. Importantly, our analysis shows how the nature of the 
initial production structure can affect both the size and distributional effects of the 
                                                 
14 In some cases, access to capital has also come from (domestic) company investments which have 
other sources of capital (such as the case of Russia in which there are energy firms that are willing to 
invest in domestic firms) or through supply contracts with international traders (as in cotton markets in 
Central Asia – Swinnen, 2007). 
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HQE. In countries with a mixed production structure, combining large and medium 
size commercial farms with small-scale household farms, such as in Latin America 
and parts of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the process is more likely 
to lead to an initial exclusion of smallholders from the HQE. In contrast, in countries 
such as China and Vietnam, India and parts of Africa, Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, where the farm sector is more uniform and dominated by small farms, the 
emergence of the HQE, although delayed, can be expected to be more inclusive. 
Transaction costs also play an important role as they may or may not reinforce 
the disadvantaged position of less productive producers – depending on the nature of 
the transaction costs. Reducing these transaction costs, for example by investments in 
infrastructure, producer associations, third party quality control and monitoring 
institutions, could also play a role in reducing the bias against small and less efficient 
producers and speed their integration into the HQE. 
Additionally, we show that contracting between producers and processors may 
induce the HQE to be more inclusive towards less efficient producers through 
increased access to capital. We also explain how foreign direct investment may play 
an important role in this way. 
While this paper is the first attempt to model the introduction of HQ products 
in developing countries, we realize that our analysis is only the first step. Several 
issues in this process require more analysis. First, the farm heterogeneity issue and its 
relation with the HQE which has been the subject of extensive empirical analysis and 
debate, requires more extensive analysis. Second, the interactions between the 
processors and the producers in the HQE are either modelled as spot market 
transactions or as simple contracts in which processors provide producers with capital 
at a lower cost. However, there is substantial empirical evidence that this relationship   27
is often more complicated, taking the form of complex contracts or other forms of 
vertical integration. These different governance forms that are observed in the HQ 
supply chain will affect both the emergence and size of the HQ chain.  
While policies and institutions are not explicitly in our model, they do affect 
the equilibrium indirectly through their effect on the various factors which we have 
discussed. A few examples may indicate how an extended version of our model could 
be used to capture such policy effects. For example, if foreign investment rules were 
liberalized, they could stimulate the HQE through their effect on the inflow of FDI 
and reduced capital costs for producers. Public investments in infrastructure and 
institutions that promote quality control and food safety institutions could stimulate 
the HQE by reducing transaction costs in the HQ market. Economic and institutional 
reforms could also have non-linear dynamic effects on the HQE if they initially 
increase the cost of capital because of disruptions (as they did during the early years 
of the transition in Eastern Europe). In the longer run, however, institutional reform 
reduces the cost of capital as the more efficient, post-liberalization economic system 
develops. More generally, policies which affect macro-economic uncertainty and the 
security of property rights for investors are likely to affect the emergence and size of 
the HQE through their effects on the cost of capital for producers, either directly or 
through the profitability of VC arrangements. 
Finally, to further complete the analysis one should also look at the interaction 
with labor markets. HQ investments will affect labor markets as the new investments 
create off-farm employment both inside the processing facility, as well as in the 
service sector (e.g., in the areas of extension, packaging, supervision, controlling, 
marketing and transport). Some – or most – of these jobs are low skilled and may be 
taken by the poorest of the poor. Empirical studies indicate that if HQ production   28
takes place through vertically integrated company-owned farms, this may have 
different effects on rural households than when they can start producing HQ 
commodities themselves (see e.g. Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Maertens et al., 
2008).   
In summary, all these factors should be considered when attempting to 
analyze the effect of the emergence of HQ markets on households in developing and 
transition countries. These combined effects are likely to be complex. These and other 
issues should be the focus of future research and we hope that such models can build 
upon the theoretical framework that is developed in this paper.   29
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Figure 1. HQ Production under Different Production Structures 
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Figure 5. Impact of Contracting on the HQE Equilibrium 
 
 